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THE RIGHT TO A HEARING PRIOR TO TERMINATION
OF UTILITY SERVICES
INTRODUCTION

Recent cases1 decided in several circuits have ruled on the right
of a customer of a public utility to obtain a hearing prior to termination of service by the utility. In each instance the utility involved was
a private corporation. The actions were all brought under section 1983
of title 42 of the United States Code,2 and in all but one case, the
plaintiff-consumer obtained at least partial relief.
The cases have involved differing factual and procedural settings.
In all instances, however, the defendant has been a public utility supplying either electricity or natural gas under the aegis of a state regulatory scheme, and the plaintiffs have been residential users of such
services. While the nature and scope of the regulatory schemes show
considerable variety, certain aspects of them are common to each case.
For example, each public utility has the authority to terminate serv1. Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
93 S. Ct. 928 (1973); Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir.
1972); Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Stanford v. Gas Serv. Co., 346 F. Supp. 717 (D. Kan. 1972); Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co.,
342 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1972), appeal docketed, No. 72-1772, 6th Cir., June 22,
1972.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or any other proper proceeding for redress.
Section 1983 was originally enacted as § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13,
also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act. The original language has been substantially
unchanged.
28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970) confers original nonexclusive jurisdiction in federal
district courts:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action

authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity
secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress
providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States . . ..
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ice for nonpayment of past due service charges.3 Additionally, some
of the companies have been clearly authorized to enter a plaintiff's
residence and remove their own equipment without being subject
to a civil action for trespass. 4
Service was terminated, or at least temporarily disconnected, in
the following situations: (1) The consumer claimed to have paid
the service charge, but had no record of payment. The company denied
receipt of the payment and ignored the fact that the plaintiff continued to pay undisputed portions of his bills.3 (2) The plaintiff was
presented with a bill far in excess of the usual monthly charge and
refused to pay the excess amount. 6 (3) The plaintiff allegedly deposited
payment in the mails before the closeout date indicated on the bill,
7
but the defendant denied receipt.
In none of the instances has the amount in dispute-ranging
from a maximum of $1478 down to $9.89 0-- been large. The pecuniary
aspect of the dispute does not, however, indicate the severity of the
problem. The deprivation of a vital service is capable of inflicting great
harm on the customer, particularly where the service provides heat
or cooking facilities in a cold climate. Unlike the usual seller-purchaser
situation, the consumer has no alternate source of supply. While the
onus of payment may be particularly severe on low income customers,
that issue will not be discussed here 10 since the status of the plaintiff
is immaterial to the real questions involved.
3. See, e.g., N.Y. TRANSP. CORP. LAW § 15 (McKinney Supp. 1972); OHIo RV..
§ 4933.12 (1970).
4. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE § 4933.12 (1970); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 196.171

CODE

(1957).

5. Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638, 643 (7th Cir. 1972).
6. Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
The facts underlying this case are illustrative. According to the complaint, the company had investigated and found that plaintiff's landlord had tapped into her line. Nonetheless, plaintiff continued to be billed for the excess charge. An emergency relief
check was obtained from the Social Welfare Services office and turned over to the defendant company, which thereafter proceeded to lose the check, Service was finally
restored after intervention by the local legal aid society. Id. at 444-45.
7. See Brief for Appellee at xii, Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., No. 72-1772 (6th
Cir., filed June 22, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellee]. Eight plaintiffs
brought suit in Palmer. In addition to the situation noted in the text, some plaintiffs
had entered into arrangements with the utility which were intended to extend the
time for payments of a past due account. Because of a dispute as to the terms of
the extension, service was terminated. In one instance it was alleged that no notice of
any kind was received by the plaintiff. Id.
8. 350 F. Supp. at 445.
9. 466 F.2d at 643 n.6.
10. See, e.g., Morgan v. Kennedy, 331 F. Supp. 861 (D. Neb. 1971) (court
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The consumer-plaintiffs have generally sought to enjoin the defendant utilities from terminating service without adequate notice of
the intended disconnection, and an opportunity to dispute the validity
of the charge at an impartial hearing." They have argued that a notice
of termination is inadequate if it does not inform a consumer of the
recourses available to him,1 2 or that does not clearly advise him that
it is a final notice.' 3 The defendants have responded that the notice
that has been sent has conformed with the requirements imposed upon
the utilities by either state statute, 4 agency regulation, 5 or a company
rule adopted pursuant to a public service commission regulation.' 6
The nature and scope of the hearing demanded by the plaintiffs
have not been clearly defined. In Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power
Co., a demand was made for a hearing conducted by an "impartial decision maker."' 17 In the other cases, the plaintiffs apparently have
denied contention of plaintiff that he was entitled to free utility service by virtue of his
poverty status); Note, Public Utilities and the Poor, 78 YALE L.J. 448 (1969).
In three of the principal cases, an issue as to the poverty status of the plaintiff
has been raised. In Thrke v. Northern States Power Co., the action had been brought

by plaintiff individually, as a representative of a class composed of all customers of
the utility in St. Paul, Minn., and as a representative of a subclass composed of
those persons who were unable to pay for utility service because of their poverty status.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed that portion of the district court order dismissing the
class action, foregoing consideration of the poverty issue. 459 F.2d at 572. In Lucas, the
plaintiff argued on appeal that his indigency might affect the result of the case. The
court, noting that when the original action had been brought the plaintiff had been
solvent, dismissed this contention. 466 F.2d at 643-45. The Bronson plaintiff was apparently a welfare recipient when she commenced suit, but this was not a factor in the
court's decision. 350 F. Supp. at 445.
11. Additionally, the plaintiffs in Palmer sought punitive and compensatory
damages. For the common law basis of this aspect of the suit, see note 34 infra and
accompanying text.
12. Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638, 645 (7th Cir. 1972);
Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
13. 342 F. Supp. at 243. The plaintiff sought to require the utility to give notice
prior to actual termination, as opposed to giving notice that payment was overdue and
would result in termination. Id.
14. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE § 4933.12 (1964) (twenty-four hour notice required).
15. See, e.g., 16 N.Y.C.R.R. § 275.1. The New York Public Service Commission
issued this rule November 20, 1972, which was subsequent to the Bronson decision.
Notice must be given five to eight days prior to termination.
16. Neither Wisconsin statute or regulation requires that notice be given. However, Wis. ADxIN. CODE § 113.13(4) (1970), requires the utility to file its rules with
the Wisconsin Public Service Commission. The Wisconsin Electric Power Company,
defendant in the action, had filed rules pursuant to section 113.13(4) which provided that written notice would be sent to its customers prior to disconnection. No
time period is specified. 466 F.2d at 642.
17. 466 F.2d at 641.

1059

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

been willing to accept a hearing conducted by a member of the company.'8 The defendants have contended that informal channels are open
to the consumer which satisfy any reasonable hearing requirement. 9
They have asserted that an investigation as to the propriety of the
charge will be quickly made if the consumer contacts either the com21
pany2 ° or the appropriate regulatory agency.
Even before these due process issues are considered by the courts, a
determination must be made as to the threshold issue of whether or
not the acts of the company amount to "state action" or action "under
color of law." 22 Under long-standing constitutional doctrine, acts of a
purely private nature-as distinguished from acts of a "public nature"
-will not be subjected to the proscriptions of either section 1983 or
the fourteenth amendment. 23 The plaintiffs have argued that state
regulation transforms the acts of the company into state action. Alternatively, they have asserted that the public nature of the functions
performed by the utility is sufficient, independent of a consideration
21
of state regulation, to alter the status of the company's acts.
In testing the adequacy of notice and the propriety of there being
a hearing, the courts have employed uniform standards. In resolving
the state action issue, however, little uniformity of approach has been
shown. The major purpose of this comment is to explore the bases for
finding state action, and, only secondarily, to consider the manner in
which the courts have handled the due process issue.
18. Cf. note 124 infra and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638, 648 (7th Cir.
1972); Brief for Appellant at 32-36, Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., No. 72-1772 (6th
Cir., filed June 22, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant].
20. See Brief for Appellant 33-34.
21. Cf. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 196.26 (1957), which permits a complaint against a
utility to be filed, but only if the complaint is initiated by twenty-five or more persons.
Alternatively, the Public Service Commission may make an investigation on its own
motion. Id. § 196.28. The New York Public Service Commission has noted the existence of "long standing working arrangements" with the utilities it regulates. Under
this informal arrangement, a complaint filed with the Public Service Commission by
a customer has generally resulted in a suspension of a contemplated termination until
an investigation has been made by the company. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Case 26358
(Dec. 5, 1972). Nonetheless, formalization of this procedure is now being made. See
note 107 infra.
22. The courts have tended to view these terms as indistinguishable. See, e.g.,
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).
23. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); cf. note 65 infra and accompanying text.
24. Brief for Appellee at 43-48.
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DEVELOPMENT OF A FEDERALLY PROTECTED RIGHT

A. Sources in the Common Law
Conceptually, the control of public service organizations may be
traced back to ancient and early medieval periods.25 In times of scarcity,
the early church fathers imposed the doctrine of justium pretium-a
just price.2 6 Such a price would be one where the exchange worked
to the common advantage of the parties. 27 Thus, where natural market forces would prevent all but the wealthiest from entering into the
market, the government would impose controls under a rationale of
"Social Justice." 28
In medieval England, the concept was expanded so that those who
were engaged in a "public calling" would be required to serve all who
applied.20 This result was justified under the theories: (1) that the
suppliers of services held an exclusive franchise, and (2) that since
certain suppliers were engaged in a public service, they necessarily
came under the supervision of the Royal Courts. 30
These concepts, as developed in England, were brought to this
country with the colonists. 31 Eventually, those controls that were imposed on public service companies were embodied in their stategranted charters.32 Further limitations were later engrafted by judicial
interpretation.
25. B. WYMAN, PUBLIC SERVICE CoRPoRATIoNs 3-16 (1911).
26. M. GLAESER, PUBLIC UTILITIES IN AMiERICAN CAPITALISm 196 (1957).
27. Id. at 196-97.
28. Id. at 196. This concept, sometimes spoken of as distributive justice, has continued into the modern era of jurisprudence. See, e.g., J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
61 (papered. 1971).
29. B. WYMAN, supra note 25, at 4. Those occupations which were deemed a public calling varied with economic conditions of scarcity in a developing economy. Thus,
surgeons, tailors, victualers, bakers, millers, innkeepers, wharfingers and ferrymen have
been held to be engaged in public callings. Id. at 6-13.
30. Id. at 13. Where medieval guild codes were found to be inconsistent with
public service, Royal Courts held the codes to be illegal. Id. at 4. Controls were im-

posed when "the process of free competition failed in some cases to secure the public
good .

. .

."

Id. at 3. Compare this with the following argument advanced by the

appellee in Palmer:
The common law

.

. .

applies only to the open market where there exists

economic competition and freedom of contract. It does not apply to a
market which has been substantially altered by affirmative act of government.
Brief for Appellee at 15. In the medieval period, the affirmative act was the grant of
the franchise. Today, that affirmative act may result from more than mere grant of
exclusive rights. See also M. GLAESER, supra note 26, at 201.
31. M. GLAESER, supra note 26, at 204-05.
32. Id. See also B. WYMAN, supra note 25, at 24.
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Under the common law, a utility was entitled to discontinue servfor nonpayment of charges. 34 However, this could only be done
where the utility was able to show that it had such authority by virtue
of its charter, a statute or government regulation. 35 Even a self-adopted
regulation, if reasonable,3 6 was sufficient to authorize disconnection
upon default,37 whether or not a statute authorized the company to
adopt its own rules. 88
ice8 3

The reason for such a rule is that many law suits to collect small
bills against scattered consumers could result if the remedy for col9
lecting them was limited to actions at law.

Where a bona fide dispute existed as to the propriety of the charges,
however, the utility was not entitled to terminate service 40 until settlement of the suit. 41 If it discontinued service before this time, the

customer was entitled to injunctive relief and damages if it were
shown that there was no valid reason for discontinuing service. 42
B. ConstitutionalIssues
1. State Action. Under the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution, it is first necessary to establish that a defendant
33. An additional requirement that was imposed on utilities was that they give
the consumer notice prior to termination. See generally In re Guarantee & Deposit
Rules & Disconnect Procedure, 11 P.U.R. (n.s.) 439 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1935);
Annot., 112 A.L.R. 232 (1938).
34. See generally Note, The Duty of a Public Utility to Render Adequate Service:
Its Scope and Enforcement, 62 COLU3!. L. REv. 312, 326 (1962).
35. Lawrence v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 49 Ga. App. 444, 176 S.E. 75 (1934).
36. Gatton v. City of Mansfield, 67 Ohio App. 210, 36 N.E.2d 306 (1940).
37. Siegel v. Minneapolis Gas Co., 271 Minn. 127, 135 N.W.2d 60 (1965).
38. Vanderbilt v. Hackensack Water Co., 113 N.J. Eq. 166, 166 A. 298 (1933).
39. Siegel v. Minneapolis Gas Light Co., 271 Minn. 127, 129, 135 N.W.2d 60, 62
(1965); cf. In re Guarantee & Deposit Rules & Disconnect Procedure, 11 P.U.R. (n.s.)
439 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1935).
We are of the opinion . . . that the privilege of disconnection should be
considered as a technically extra-legal remedy to be invoked by the utility
only to enforce its legal rights without resort to a court of law.
These same regulations were involved in Lucas.
40. Steele v. Clinton Elec. Light & Power Co., 123 Conn. 180, 193 A. 613
(1937); Lawrence v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 49 Ga. App. 444, 176 S.E. 75,
(1934); Southwestern Gas & Elec. Co. v. Stanley, 123 Tex. 157, 70 S.W.2d 413 (1934).
41. Arnold v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 168 S.C. 163, 167 S.E. 234 (1933).
42. Steele v. Clinton Elec. Light & Power Co., 123 Conn. 180, 193 A. 613 (1937);
Southwestern Gas & Elec. Co, v. Stanley, 123 Tex. 157, 70 S.W.2d 413 (1934). In
Steele, the court noted that the utility was passing judgment on its own case. 123
Conn. at 184-85, 193 A. at 615.
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company acted under color of state law or engaged in state action,
before the due process issue can be raised.43 The "public affectation,"
or "public function," doctrine was one of the early approaches used
in defining the conceptual framework supporting the propriety of
public control of essentially private organizations.
In Olcott v. Supervisors,44 the Supreme Court concluded that ownership was not, nor ever had been, determinative of the rights or duties
of the utility. The essential criterium was the use to which the property
was put.45 The relationship viewed as paramount by the Court was not
that which existed between the private company and the state, but
rather the relationship of the private company with public.
Five years later, in Munn v. 1llinois,46 the Court expanded the
public affectation concept. It was argued that Illinois could not set
maximum rates for grain elevators which were privately owned, received no funds from the state and were not operated through a grant
or franchise from the state. The Court, however, did not find these
contentions persuasive. Chief Justice Waite, writing for the majority,
concluded that the nature of the services performed by the grain elevator companies was of sufficient public importance to alter their
purely private character.4 7 Even though the elevators were not formally
public utilities, 48 the majority nonetheless noted a strong similarity to
those enterprises which "exercise[d] a sort of public office, and have
49
duties to perform in which the public is interested."
43. See, e.g., Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 169-71 (1970).
44. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 678 (1872).
45.
No matter who is the agent, the function performed is that of the State.
Though the ownership is private the use is public.
Id. at 695.
46. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
47. The Chief Justice, in tracing the doctrine back to the seventeeth century,
cited Lord Hale in De PortibusMarls:
Looking, then, to the common law, from whence came the right which the
Constitution protects, we find that when private property is "affected with a

public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only."
Id. at 125-26.
48. Justice Field, dissenting, argued that the "public affectation" doctrine was
inappropriate unless the private property had been dedicated to public use, or a right,
bestowed by the government, was held with the property. Id. at 139-40. The argument
may be seen as an objection to the placing of a grain elevator company, which did not
operate as a monopoly, in the position of a traditional public utility., Arguably, an
electric or natural gas company, franchised and granted special power and rights by the
state, meets the test posited by Justice Field.
49. Id. at 130. Later cases, have generally looked to Munn as providing support
for the right of the state to regulate any industry which is affected with a public interest.
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The same basic rationale has also been used to protect the individual when a practice of a private company has offended a basic
constitutional right. In Marsh v. Alabama,50 the Court held that an
individual could not be prohibited from disseminating religious literature on the privately owned streets of a company town. Justice Black,
writing for the Court, stated:
Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more an
owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public
in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it .... Thus, the owners
of privately held bridges, ferries, turnpikes and railroads may not operate them as freely as a farmer does his farm. Since these facilities are
built and operated primarily to benefit the public and since their
operation is essentially a public function, it is subject to state regulation. 5 '
The absence of state regulation does not preclude a finding of state
action; the manner in which the state treats the owner is of no signifi52
cance.
In Food Employees Local 509 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,5 3 the
reasoning evident in Marsh was again employed. The Court once more

found that where an owner had dedicated his property to public use, he
would not be permitted to abridge an individual's first amendment
rights, particularly where the exercise of those rights concerned a
purpose "generally consonant with the use to which the property is
actually put."54

By a five-to-four decision in Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner,55 the
Court limited the application of Logan Valley and Marsh but did not
See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 297 & n.17 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring); American Export-Isbrandsten Lines, Inc. v. Federal Mar. Comm'n, 444 F.2d
824, 828-29 (D.C. Cir. 1970). In those cases Justice Waite's holding, rather than his
analysis, has been given the greatest emphasis. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502, 534 (1934):
The statement that one has dedicated his property to a public use is, therefore, merely another way of saying that if one embarks in a business which
public interest demands shall be regulated, he must know regulations will
ensue.
50. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
51. Id. at 506.
52. Id. at 507.
53. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
54. Id. at 320.
55. 407 U.S. 551 (1972). See also Central Hardware Co. v. NLRE, 407 U.S. 539
(1972).
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deny the rationale of those cases. 56 The majority concluded that unlike
the situation in Marsh, there had not been a complete dedication of
property to public use5 7 and, fastening upon the limitation indicated
in Logan Valley, the right claimed to have been abridged was not related to the use of the property involved.58
It may be argued that in Marsh state action was involved simply
because the state of Alabama chose to prosecute the petitioner for
criminal trespass. But it is clear from Logan Valley and Tanner that
dedication of private property to public use is the core of the test for
state action. Where municipal functions are performed, the requisite

dedication may be more readily found. 59
In another line of state action cases, the Court has considered the
relationship between the private company and the state. The test applied here is that of "substantial influence": if a regulatory agency
has closely involved itself with the functions of a utility, the requisite
60
influence may be sufficiently present to constitute state action.
[When authority derives in part from Government's thumb on the
scales, the exercise of that power by private persons becomes closely
akin, in some respects, to its exercise by Government itself.61
Under this reasoning, neither the fact that the utility performs a public function nor that it operates by virtue of a grant of a franchise from
62
the government is determinative of its duties to the public.
56. The Court noted:
The [Marsh] Court simply held that where private interests were substituting
for and performing the customary functions of government, First Amendment freedoms could not be denied where exercised in the customary manner
on the town's sidewalks and streets.
407 U.S. at 562.
57. Id. at 570.
58. Id. at 563-64. Tanner, like Logan Valley, involved a shopping center; but
unlike the latter case, the handbilling-which concerned the Vietnam war-was not
related to one of the normal uses of the center.
59. Id. at 569. Arguably, the function which a public utility performs is a municipal
function, in that the state or -local government would undoubtedly perform the service
if no private organization were willing to do so. Furthermore, "dedication to public
use" is apparent with respect to a utility, for, with minor exceptions, the utility must
serve all who apply. See note 34 supraand accompanying text.
60. Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
61. American Commun. Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 401 (1950). See also,Lewis,
The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUmn. L. REv. 1083, 1116 (1960).
62. 343 U.S. at 462. In Pollak the Court frequently alluded to the point that
the Public Utility Commission had initiated an investigation of certain practices of the
utility-in this instance, a bus company. Ostensibly, it could be argued that the holding
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This test has been primarily developed in civil rights actions.
In these cases, the economic function of the business involved has not
been treated as a central issue. 63 The courts have instead been more
concerned with the fact that the state may have asserted "substantial
influence" in promoting discriminatory behavior. Thus, in Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority,64 the Court was able to find the existence of state action where a restaurant, operated on property leased
from a state authority, discriminated or racial grounds. The Court
enunciated a standard which has stood for the last decade:
Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious
involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true sig-

nificance. 65

The decision did not rest on the concept that the restaurant was performing a public function; neither was it thought significant that it
conducted business by virtue of a franchise granted by the state. Rather,
the failure of the state to prevent racial discrimination, which could
have been accomplished by incorporation of appropriate terms in the
lease, 6 was found to be of paramount importance.0 7
of Pollak may be limited to those circumstances where the regulatory body had actively
manifested approval of the utility's actions. Cf. Williams, The Twilight of State Action,
41 TExAs L. Rxv. 347, 359 (1963).
Not only formal acts, but informal acts of the state may be a significant influence
to bring those acts within the penumbra of state actions. See, e.g., Kletschka v. Driver,
411 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1969):
[I]nformal, behind the scenes exertion of state authority is as much within
the scope of § 1983 as the more usual examples of formal and open action
leading to the denial of federal rights.
Id. at 447. Chief Judge Lumbard concluded that where the act complained of was
the joint product of a state power and a non-state power, the applicability of the
fourteenth amendment and section 1983 would be determined by the significance of the
role of the state power. Id. at 449.
63. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Bell v. Maryland, 378
U.S. 226 (1964).
64. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).

65. Id. at 722.
66. In certain circumstances, courts have explicitly held that inaction of the state
may amount to state action. However, the cases so holding have been decided against

a background of state sanction of "invidious discrimination." See, e.g., Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967); Huey v. Barloga, 277 F. Supp. 864 (N.D. Ill.
1967).
67. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961). There is
some authority to suggest that the standards employed to find state action in the socalled racial discrimination cases may not enjoy universal applicability. See, e.g.,
Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 190-91 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring
and dissenting); Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382, 1394 (N.D. Ind. 1970).
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The reach of this approach, however, may have been limited by
the Supreme Court in Moose Lodge No. 107 v.

IrVis. 68

There, the

Court held that the mere granting of a liquor license, or subjection to
"[s]tate regulation in any degree whatsoever" would not serve to defeat
the distinction between private and public conduct as that differentiation was made in the Civil Rights Cases.6 9 Thus, even in the presence
of state regulation, it may be necessary to look to the public function
doctrine if state action is to be found.
The two doctrines are not mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, the
courts tended to ignore the public function approach. It may be that
they have assumed that once the possiblity of state regulation was assured, the public interest would be sufficiently protected. Where there
has been an absence of state regulation, as in Marsh and Logan Valley,
and certain preferred interests have been involved, the courts have been
willing to extend the Munn analysis. In those cases this was easily
accomplished because of the preferred position occupied by first amendment rights70 But there is no reason to suppose that first amendment
rights are the only rights which occupy a position sufficiently preferred
so as to extend the public function doctrine. The increasing attention
recently given to fourteenth amendment rights may suggest that they
are of sufficient importance to justify the use of the public function
approach. Even though state regulation of industry has become pervasive, 71 it has addressed itself primarily to economic interests. Where
other interests are involved, which remain unprotected by state regulation,72 it may be appropriate to extend the public affectation doctrine.
2. Due Process. Even if the public utility consumer establishes
that the acts of the utility do, in fact, involve state action under the
doctrine of "public function" or "pervasive regulation," relief will be
granted only if the utility has violated a customer's procedural due
process right. Essentially, the demand in the principal cases has been
68. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
69. Id. at 173. Cf. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
70. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. at 509.
71. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 62, at 367: "[I]t is difficult to conceive of situations where state action is not present." See also Horowitz, The Misleading Search for
"State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. Rav. 208 (1957).
72. The observation has been made that the function of state regulation has come
to be protection of the regulated industry rather than protection of the consumer.
See Jordan, Producer Protection, Prior Market Structure and the Effects of Government Regulation, 15 J.L. & EcoN. 151 (1972).
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for adequate notice of termination coupled with a right to an impartial
hearing where there is a dispute as to the propriety of the charge.18
The Supreme Court has made clear the general standards by which
the adequacy of the notice will be judged, assuming that a right to
notice exists. The notice must be
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections .... The notice must be of
such nature as reasonably to convey the required information . ..
and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their
appearance ....But if with due regard to the practicalities and peculiarities of the case these conditions are reasonably met, the constitutional requirements are satisfied.
S. .[W]hen notice is a person's due, process which is a mere
gesture is not due process.7 4
In considering whether or not a hearing will be required, different
questions are raised. In order for a public utility consumer to establish he is entitled to a hearing, it will be necessary to show that the
receipt of service is the kind of interest protected by the fourteenth
amendment. This will not depend on definitional differences between
a "right" and a "privilege. '7 5 In Bell v. Burson, 6 the Court held that
once the state had seen fit to grant a party a driver's license, the party
could not be deprived of his license without an opportunity to be
heard, as the livelihood of the driver may have come to depend on
the governmentally granted entitlement. Justice Brennan, writing for
the Court, noted:
This is but an application of the general proposition that relevant
constitutional restraints limit state power to terminate an entitlement
whether the entitlement is denominated a "right" or a "privilege.17 7
The notice of the hearing may vary provided that it occurs before
termination of the entitlement become effective. 8
73. See notes 11-13 supra and accompanying text.
74. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950).
See also Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm.
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
75. See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constilutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968). See also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365 (1971).
76. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
77. Id. at 539.
78. Id. at 542-43.
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The same principle was employed in Goldberg v. Kelly,79 where
a hearing subsequent to termination of welfare assistance was held to
be inadequate. Applying a balancing test, the Court found that the
governmental interest in summary judgment was outweighed by the
loss the recipient would incur while awaiting a final determination
of his rights. 80 Thus, a prior hearing was required to protect against the
possibility of improper loss.
The applicability of Bell v. Burson and Goldbergmay require that
the receipt of a public utility service be conceptualized as an entitlement of the consumer. 81 Other recent Supreme Court cases provide
82
support for this approach. In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,
Wisconsin statutes permitted the prejudgment garnishment of wages.
The Court held that guarantees of due process applied, since wages
were deemed to be property within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment.8 3 Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion, took an analytically more refined approach:
The "property" of which petitioner has been deprived is the use of
the garnished portion of her wages during the interim period between
the garnishment and the culmination of the main suit. Since this
deprivation cannot be characterized as de minimis, she must be accorded the usual requisites of procedural due process: notice and a
prior hearing.84
The Court in Fuentes v. Shevin s5 considered a debtor's right to a
hearing prior to replevy of chattels by the creditor, and concluded that
the protection afforded by the fourteenth amendment extended to all
important interests, and not just to necessities.86 The fact that the
debtor did not have full title to the chattel did not militate against this
result. The mere deprivation of continued use of the goods represented
an invasion of a significant property interest which is constitutionally
79. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).

80. Id. at 266.
81. Cf. Note, supra note 34. See also Brief for Appellee at 54-55. But see Morgan
v. Kennedy, 331 F. Supp. 861 (D. Neb. 1971).

82. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
83. 395 U.S. at 340.
84.
not the
in issue.
85.
86.

Id. at 342. Similarly, with electricity, gas, water and like commodities, it is
commodity itself, but the right to receive and utilize the commodity which is
407 U.S. 67 (1972).
Id. at 88-90; cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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protected.87 The fact that the debtor may receive redress through the
courts at a later time does not diminish the right to a hearing prior
to the taking.
[N]o later hearing and no damage award can alter the fact that
the arbitrary taking that was subject to the right of procedural due
process has already occurred. "This Court has not.. . embraced the
88
general proposition that a wrong may be done if it can be undone."
II.

ADOPTING AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

The foregoing has considered the principles that may apply to the
granting of a hearing as requested by the utilities' customers. No attempt will be made to analyze in detail the manner in which each
court handled the issues before it. Rather, the purpose here is to
examine some of the inconsistencies in the opinions and to suggest
that the adoption of an alternative approach-the public function
doctrine-could obviate some of the problems raised and left unanswered, both as to the state action and due process issues.
A. State Action
The approaches which the courts have used in resolving this issue
have relied heavily upon the relationship between the utility and the
state, rather than between the individual and the utility. Thus, the
majority opinion in Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Company,80
the one recent case which denied the plaintiff relief, concluded that
the mere enactment of state regulations was not sufficient to find the
requisite state action. Wisconsin, by merely permitting the utility to
terminate service, did not compel it to do so. Nor did the court think
it significant that the company was authorized, under state statute,00
to enter private property. The authorization was permissive, not compulsory. To the court, the fact that the company did not make phys87. 407 U.S. at 86.
88. Id. at 82, citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647 (1972). See generally
Gardner, Fuentes v.Shevin: The New York Creditor and Replevin, 22 BUFFALO L. REV.
17 (1972). For a more general discussion of the rights of debtors in light of Sniadach
and Fuentes, see Rogge, Treatment of Debtors, 22 BUFFALO L. REv. 45 (1972).
89. 466 F.2d 638 (1972).
90. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 196.171 (1957).
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ical entry made the question of authorization immaterial. Thus, the
court was able to view the state of Wisconsin as neither a "joint participant," nor as a "direct beneficiary" of the company's actions. 91 The
state had not taken significant action with respect to the company. The
court additionally concluded that although the company enjoyed
monopolistic rights,9 2 this did not adversely affect the consumer. Even
if a competitor existed, it was unlikely that a consumer, who could not
forestall a termination by paying a disputed bill under protest, could
have obtained alternative service within the five-day notice period.
The other courts which have considered the problem have generally employed the pervasive regulation doctrine to find state action.
They have supported this particular approach on the basis of factual
circumstances; 93 that the particularactivity came "under the umbrella
of a state statute or state authorized regulation . .".; or, in contrast,
9 5
that the regulatory or statutory scheme was especially broad.
There is also language in several of the opinions to indicate that
the courts have at least been influenced by the public function doctrine. One court failed to recognize that the public affectation doctrine
may function quite independently of the pervasive regulation approach 6 Indeed, the courts have, somewhat confusingly, argued that
the factor of regulationmay alter the function of the utility:
91. 466 F.2d at 648-49.
92. The Supreme Court in Moose Lodge suggested that a finding that a private
concern occupied a monopoly position by virtue of a state franchise would lend
support to a conclusion that state action was present. Even though the Court did not
find that, in Moose Lodge, there existed a monopoly position conferred by grant of a
liquor license, it implied that a different result might obtain where the service involved "includes such necessities of life as electricity, water, and police and fire protection." 407 U.S. at 173.
93. Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566, 569 (8th Cir. 1972).
Some of the factors influencing the court were that the city of St. Paul, Minn. 1) had
the right to review the regulations of the utility; 2) collected a special fee based on the
utility's gross receipts; 3) had to give prior approval to certain conduct of the company;
and 4) had the right to review the operations of the company. Id. at 569.
94. Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 342 F. Supp. 241, 246 (N.D. Ohio 1972). See
OHio Rav. CODE §§ 4905.26, 4933.12 (1964).
95. Stanford v. Gas Serv. Co., 346 F. Supp. 717, 721 (D. Kan. 1972).
96. Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d at 569. The court stated:
Federal courts have generally recognized private conduct as "color of law"
or "state action" when it performs a "public" function and is subjected to
"public" regulation.
(Emphasis added.) In finding state action, the Ihrke court felt it was necessary to
distinguish Kadlec v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 407 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1969) which had
held that state action was not involved because Illinois Bell had set its own regulations. Thus, it appears that the Ihrke court has made the implicit assumption that
public function and regulation must exist concurrently for state action to be found.
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Where the state has so involved itself with a private concern,
the concern can be said to act for the state .... This involvement,
both in breadth and purpose, indicates that the state has franchised
[the utility] to carry on what is clearly a quasi-public function. Thus,
7
the utility is licensed to and does act as an agent of the state.0

If the function is public, there is little reason to look to the nature of
the regulation. Creating a category of "quasi-public" functions does
little to clarify the problem before the courts.
The public function influence may also be seen where the courts
have considered the importance of particular factual circumstances.
Thus, one court reasoned that when the company's "collector"-i.e.,
the employees responsible for physical termination-entered the consumer's residence, they were acting in a governmental capacity.98 That
court, alluding to the factual situation found in Fuentes,analogized the
role of a collector to that of a sheriff. But, if the public function viewpoint was not articulated, the court nonetheless may be seen to be embracing some of the concomitants of that doctrine. By comparing the
company's entry onto private property to the acts of a formal agent
of the state, the court is effectively admitting that the utility performs
functions in the nature of a governmental unit.
In contrast to these analyses, the strong dissent which was filed
in Lucas approached the state action issue on a variety of grounds.
Unlike the majority, which did not consider the function performed
by the utility, the dissent argued that the monopoly aspects of the
utility's franchise brought the utility within the "public affectation"
doctrine as enunciated in Munn v. Illinois.0 9 The "state-like action then
being exercised by public utilities under careful and detailed State
control," were within the intended coverage of the predecessor statutes
to section 1983 at the time of their enactment. 10 0 Additionally, the
dissent attacked the majority position by aruging that pervasive state
regulations made the acts of the company state action.
The defendant utility operates as an agent of the state under
the supervision and regulation of the defendant Public Service Commissioners, who are jointly responsible for its acts, in satisfaction of the
requirements of "state action" and "under color" of state law.101
97.
98.

Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 341 F. Supp. at 246.

99. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
100. 466 F.2d at 661.

101. Id. at 665.
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Finally, according to the dissent, common law standards would have
been sufficient to afford relief to the plaintiff. By virtue of the Public
Service Commission's 1935 order, the state had affirmed those common
law values, in addition to insinuating itself into the problems of
disconnection. 102
Two rough groupings of the judicial reasoning in the cases may
be made. Under the "pervasive regulation" formula, state action will
be found by virtue of a "partnership" that exists between the state and
the utility. Acts of the "private" half of the partnership will then be
imputed to the "public" half, but only to the extent that the state has
manifested approval of those acts. 0 3 Alternatively, the "partnership"
may be viewed to be so heavily ruled by the "public" partner that the
utility becomes an agent of the state. The conduct of the utility may
then be analogized to the conduct of an administrative body. If the utility were a publicly owned corporation, this is most likely the approach
the courts would take. 04 If the "public affectation" doctrine is used,
however, the conception of the role of the public utility is broader,
and the distinction between public and private becomes irrelevant.
The utility is seen to exist as a separate governmental unit because
of its relationship to the public at large.
From the viewpoint of the consumer, the distinction between a
private and a public service unit is immaterial. He has no effective
choice from whom he shall receive the needed service. Predicating the
rights of the consumer upon a public-private distinction seems to be
invalid since the utility operates by virtue of a governmental franchise. The courts, in utilizing the pervasive regulation doctrine, have
assumed the validity of that distinction, concluding that the invocation
of the state's regulatory powers minimizes the public-private dichotomy.
Certainly, the roles of private concerns in the economy are undergoing changes.
The emerging model of our society is that of a public-private
partnership. The relationship is reciprocal. Government not only aids
the private sector, but in addition many public functions are performed by private businesses and institutions.... There is a blurring
102. Id. at 668-69.
103. See, e.g., Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436, 448 (2d Cir. 1969); cf.
Lewis supra note 61, at 359.
104. See, e.g., Morgan v. Kennedy, 331 F. Supp. 861 (D. Neb. 1971). But see
Davis v. Weir, 328 F. Supp. 317 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
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of the lines between "public" and "private" both in the political sense
and legal sense. The public interest unavoidably extends to much of

that which is nominally private. 10

Nevertheless, it is the function that the private institution performs that "blurs the lines," and not the fact that the institution is
regulated. The state's right to regulate is predicated upon the state's
police power; that power may be asserted when the protection of the
public interest demands that the rights of a private party-the regulated enterprise-be infringed upon. This approach acknowledges a distinction between private and public property. The utility companies
have been given the right to manage or produce a valuable resource.
The courts have tended to treat that right as a private one, albeit one
subject to state regulation. It is not necessary, however, that it be so
treated. There is no reason to believe that the state intended, in granting the right, that the value of the resource would be permitted to
inure strictly to the benefit of the utility. Professor Reich has argued:
These values should not be treated as property and the law should
make every effort to see that they do not become property in the
hands of the holders ....
If the government retained close supervision
over the activities of the holders of these valuables, and also accepted
the ultimate responsibility for the services performed, this would further avoid any similarity to private property. 0 0
Clearly, it is within the power of the state to insure that the resource,

nominally within the control of a private concern, is not treated as
private property. The state may, for example, require that the holder
of the franchise conduct its relationships with its customers in a
manner that conforms to traditional standards of due process. 07 But
105. Reich, Social Welfare in the Public-PrivateState, 114 U. PA. L. Rnv. 487,
489 (1966) ; cf. the court's statement in Palmer:
As in other areas of the law, there are borderlines between governmental and private action, and there can be no question but that the facts
set forth put this problem right at the borderline.
342 F. Supp. at 244.
106. Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1227, 1266-67 (1966).
107. Cf. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961). New
York State is now in the process of adopting regulations which will require public
utility corporations to conduct an investigation in "an appropriate and fair manner"
in response to complaints. The proposed regulations read in part:
Section 143.8 Billing Disputes
(a) Every electric corporation shall establish procedures whereby any
complaint filed with such corporation by any customer thereof in regard to any
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if the resources are not to be treated as private property, the logic
of the "pervasive regulation" path to finding state action may falter.
The public function doctrine supplies an alternate, and more appropriate, approach.
Another factor militates against the sole reliance on the pervasive
regulation doctrine, at least from the plaintiff's point of view. The
implication may be drawn from Moose Lodge that regulation by itself
will not necessarily ordain that state action will be found, without a
closer scrutiny of the nature and scope of the regulatory scheme. It is
still possible that a very elaborate scheme will not "create" state action if the utility fails to exercise all the powers granted it. In the one
case in which relief was not granted, the court was able to justify its
conclusion that state action was not involved because the utility did
not in fact enter the plaintiff's property, even though it might have
done so under state statute. 10 8 Thus, if the regulation is minimal, or
if the utility does not take full advantage of the regulations, the consumer might not recover. Hence, the less the consumer is already
protected, the less likely will be his chances of successfully asserting
that he should be protected. If the plaintiff asserts the "public function" doctrine, he may avoid this dilemma.
bill for service rendered or deposit required will be promptly investigated in
an appropriate and fair manner, with the result of such investigation being
promptly reported to the complaining customer. Such procedures shall allow
the acceptance and processing of complaints submitted in simple manner and
form. Whether or not a notice of discontinuance has previously been sent, the
utility's procedures shall provide that pending the utility's investigation it
shall not discontinue service or issue a notice of discontinuance; provided, however, the consumer may be required to pay the undisputed portion of a disputed bill or deposit to prevent discontinuance or the issuance of
a notice of discontinuance.
(b) If . . . the utility determines that the disputed service has been
rendered, or that the disputed charge . . . is proper, in whole or in part,
it may require the full bill . . . or the appropriate portion thereof to be paid
...
. If the customer then fails to pay such required amount, the utility's
procedures may provide for discontinuance of service ....
Section 143.9 Publicizing Complaint Procedures
(a) Every electric corporation shall, by a notice accompanying a
regular bill, advise each of its customers periodically . . . of the procedures
available to customers to register complaints in regard to service or disputed
bills.
16 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 143.8, 143.9 (proposed), quoted in N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Case
26358 (Dec. 5, 1972). Similar provisions have been proposed for gas, water, steam and
telephone companies.
108. Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638, 656 (7th Cir. 1972).
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The courts which have granted relief have characterized the right
to receive services as an entitlement. 10 9 This characterization has been
made independently of a finding of state action. The impact of Burson
and Goldberg was to eliminate the distinction between a right and a
privilege. Prior to those decisions, courts felt safe in concluding that due
process safeguards did not attach to "privileges."' 110 However, since
neither of these decisions involved private interests, the only interests
to be protected would be those granted by the government.
To apply due process to "private" organizations, some form of state
action must be found irrespective of how the property requirement has
been satisfied. Professor Berle has suggested that
corporate organizations of business . . . are no longer private phe-

nomena; that they are public organisms; and that American constitutional and common law imposes certain basic limitations on them to
assure individual rights. One way of doing this... is to apply fundamental limitations of law to any "governing power," such as a
corporation or labor union.111
The use of the "entitlement" concept fits more comfortably under
this view, or the similar view put forward by the dissent in Lucas.1 2
Ostensibly, the argument may be made that if the state action is found
because of a "partnership" relation, the utility serves as a conduit of
the entitlement for the state. The courts have not, however, articulated
this. The notion that an interest is to be protected as an entitlement
is grounded upon the relationship between the grantor and the recipient. If the entitlement may not be interfered with by the utility, it is
either because the utility acts as a government surrogate, or because
it has conveyed an interest from the government. It is not clear
from the opinions that this is what the courts intended. The public
function approach would avoid this sort of confusion.
Additional support for the governmental unit approach may be
found in the rationale behind the remedies that have traditionally
109. See, e.g., Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443, 447
(S.D.N.Y. 1972); Stanford v. Gas Serv. Corp., 346 F. Supp. 717, 721 (D. Kan.
1972); Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 342 F. Supp. 241, 244 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
110. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, supra note 75. See also Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971).
111. Berle, Legal Problems of Economic Power, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 4, 9 (1960).
See also Friedman, Corporate Power, Government by Private Groups, and the Law,
57 COLUa. L. REv. 155, 176 (1957); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733,
772-73 (1964).
112. See notes 100 & 101 supra and accompanying text.
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been made available in state courts. 113 Such relief has been grounded
not on a theory of state regulation, but rather on one of "public function." Expanding concepts of what constitutes interests protected by
the fourteenth amendment requires extending due process to any
instance of state action which affects that interest. The application
of Sniadach and Fuentes can be readily made on the basis that a governmental unit-the utility-is directly involved.
B. Due Process
Only if the court finds the requisite state action will it have to
consider the due process issues. Even though the Lucas court did not
find the acts of the defendant utility amounted to state action, the conduct of the Wisconsin Public Service Commissioners, (who had been
joined as codefendants) was unquestionably under color of state law.
Thus, it was forced to consider the due process issue in relation to the
commissioners. The court concluded that the state regulatory scheme
fulfilled due process requirements. The consumer had several remedies available to him. Informal disposition of the dispute could be
effected through channels provided by the company or through the
offices of the commission. Alternatively, formal disposition could be
obtained through state courts. The consumer could seek emergency
relief, pay under protest and seek a refund, or seek damages in tort
for wrongful termination.-" A separate, impartial hearing would not
be required, as Commission supervision and the self-interest of the
company in avoiding potential liability assured "impartiality in collecting arrearages.""115 The five-day notice of termination which the
plaintiff received was held to be adequate, even though it did not
116
inform the plaintiff of remedies available to him.
The other opinions have rejected the argument made by the Lucas
majority on several grounds. The notion that channels open to the
consumer afford him a substantial opportunity to be heard has been
rejected on factual grounds. 1 7 Second, the opportunity to turn to the
113. See notes 34-42 supra and accompanying text.
114. 466 F.2d at 648-49.
115. Id. at 652.
116. Id. at 653.
117. The court in Palmer stated:
The evidence as a whole revealed a rather shockingly callous and impersonal
attitude upon the part of the defendant, which relied uncritically upon its
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state courts has been deemed a "non-alternative,"' 1 8 which does not
satisfy due process requirements. As Fuentes, Sniadach, Goldberg and
Burson have made clear, the possibility of later corrective action does
not diminish the requirement that a hearing prior to termination be
held. Further, the fact that a large number of people acting jointly
are required to initiate a complaint with the regulatory body has been
said to effectively deny a right to be heard."-0 Finally, the availability
of state injunctive relief has not precluded the granting of similar
120
relief in a federal court.
The real distinction between the Lucas majority and the adverse
opinions as to what will constitute adequate notice rests on an interpretation of the word "meaningful." One court took particular cognizance
of the fact that the utility apparently notified its customers in a shotgun manner.' 21 To be meaningful, not only would the notice have to
give a clear and believable warning that termination was about to
occur, it must also advise the customer of the recourses available to
him.
Undoubtedly, the imposition on the utility of the requirement of
providing a hearing and more meaningful notice will pose difficulties,
increased costs will be shifted to the consumer in the form of increased
utility rates. Certainly, in fashioning their remedies, the courts should
carefully explore the "practicalities and peculiarities of the case"' 28
in order to minimize the financial impact on the consumer.
The requirements of the hearing may be adequately fulfilled
through the use of informal procedures. The circumstances suggest
computer located in a distant city, and the far from infallible clerks who
served it, and paid no attention to the notorious uncertainties of the postal
service.
342 F. Supp. at 243.
118. Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
119. Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638, 669-70 (7th Cir. 1972)
(dissenting opinion).
120. Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
Cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961).
121. Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 342 F. Supp. 241, 242-43. The defendant
had approximately 140,000 customers in the Toledo area. The evidence before the
court established that between 120,000 to 140,000 shut-off notices were sent annually.
Actual termination occurred in only about 6000 instances.
122. The Columbia Gas Co. has maintained that as a result of the district court's
order, the percentage of delinquencies to total billing has increased nearly 14 percent
over comparable periods. Reply Brief for Appellant at 28, Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co.,
No. 72-1772 (6th Cir., filed June 22, 1972).
123. See notes 73 & 74 supraand accompanying text.
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that, because of the small amounts involved and the frequency with
which disputes may arise, formal hearings may not compel rapid disposition of the dispute. An internal hearing-that is, one conducted by
a person of at least managerial status within the company-may be'
124
sufficient to satisfy the hearing requirements.

CONCLUSION

These cases represent a readjustment, however slight, of the relationship among the individual, the government, and private enterprise. From a narrow economic viewpoint, the imposition of new
duties on utilities--duties which have been characteristically imposed
on government-may be seen to represent no gain to the consumer.
Indeed, from that perspective, the burden of those duties will come to
rest not upon the utility, but upon the public.
At the same time, the important interest which the consumer has
in assuring for himself continued service may overshadow the financial
burden he may eventually have to bear. In a real sense, however, the
significance of these cases goes beyond that specific consideration. Justice
Marshall, in his dissent in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,2 5 stated:
It would not be surprising in the future to see cities rely more
and more on private businesses to perform functions once performed
by governmental agencies. The advantage of reduced expenses and
increased tax base cannot be overstated. As governments rely on
private enterprise,
public property decreases in favor of privately
12
owned property.

If the courts restrict their view to the nature of the ownership, and
government turns over functions to private enterprise, rights which
the individual previously had may be diminished. In the future, if the
courts, in defining the relationship between "private" businesses and
the individual, are to find that the rights will continue unabated,
they will have to ground their conclusion on a theory that takes cognizance of the function the enterprise performs.
124. See Brief for Appellant at 32-36. The Columbia Gas Co., prior to entry of
decision in Palmer, had established the position of Urban Affairs Coordinator. He
has the power to intervene on behalf of the consumer and prevent termination prior
to settlement of the dispute.
125. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
126. Id. at 586.
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Conceptualizing public utilities as a government substitute confronts that issue. The public affectation approach has the advantage,
not only of a simplified analysis, but one that more adequately handles
the questions raised by the relationship between the adverse parties.
It rests for precedential value on cases that have considered the business context of the dispute, rather than on racial discrimination cases
that may be inapposite. And, as the Lucas dissent has forcibly contended, companies performing public functions fall within the intended coverage of the fourteenth amendment.
ANTHONY ILARDI, JR.
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